Por favor utiliza este link para citar o compartir este documento: http://repositoriodigital.academica.mx/jspui/handle/987654321/440051
Palabras clave: Filosofía
normative propositions
logic of norms
logic of normative propositions
Editorial: Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
Descripción: It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive interpretation of norm sentences can be regarded as a distinction between two kinds of utterances. A norm or a directive has as its content a normative proposition. A normative (performative) utterance of a normative proposition in appropriate circumstances makes the proposition true, and an assertive (descriptive) utterance has as its truth-maker the norm system to which it refers. This account of norms, norm-contents, and utterances of norm sentences solves Jørgensens problem: logical relations among norms can be defined in the usual way in terms of the truth-conditions of the normative propo- sitions which form their content. There is no distinction between the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions; in this respect the present account differs from Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygins account of the logic of normative propositions.
Other Identifiers: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340030293003
Aparece en las Colecciones:Análisis Filosófico

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