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|Título:||NORMS, NORMATIVE UTTERANCES, AND NORMATIVE PROPOSITIONS|
logic of norms
logic of normative propositions
|Editorial:||Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico|
|Descripción:||It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive interpretation of norm sentences can be regarded as a distinction between two kinds of utterances. A norm or a directive has as its content a normative proposition. A normative (performative) utterance of a normative proposition in appropriate circumstances makes the proposition true, and an assertive (descriptive) utterance has as its truth-maker the norm system to which it refers. This account of norms, norm-contents, and utterances of norm sentences solves Jørgensens problem: logical relations among norms can be defined in the usual way in terms of the truth-conditions of the normative propo- sitions which form their content. There is no distinction between the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions; in this respect the present account differs from Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygins account of the logic of normative propositions.|
|Aparece en las Colecciones:||Análisis Filosófico|
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