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Campo DCValorLenguaje
dc.creatorAlfonso Mendieta-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-20T19:23:40Z-
dc.date.available2015-04-20T19:23:40Z-
dc.identifierhttp://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102-
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositoriodigital.academica.mx/jspui/handle/987654321/425752-
dc.descriptionAdministered protection is not the only outcome of antidumping measures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interaction between a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importing market, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce and sustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that price distortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achievement of the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are altered relative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firm s propensity to collude and prompting foreign firm s.-
dc.formatapplication/pdf-
dc.languageen-
dc.publisherCentro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.-
dc.relationhttp://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323-
dc.rightsEconomía Mexicana. Nueva Época-
dc.sourceEconomía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIV-
dc.subjectEconomía y Finanzas-
dc.subjectprice competition-
dc.subjectrepeated interaction-
dc.subjecttacit collusion-
dc.subjectantidumping-
dc.titleAlternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried?-
dc.typeArtículo científico-
Aparece en las Colecciones:Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época

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