Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – An Analogical Reading

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Abstract

Postnationalists like Habermas have suggested EU citizenship as a way to overcome nationalisms, grounding political belonging on the body of laws that members of the post-national polity generate in the public sphere. Cosmopolitan communitarianists like Bellamy think that EU citizens should form a mixed-commonwealth, with political belonging based on their nations. I will argue that the second option is more desirable and submit the analogical character of the ensuing ideas of citizenship, identity and polity. Cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship promises to better foster the great richness of European national cultural, religious, historical, political, legal and linguistic diversity while still maintaining a certain unity to form a ‘mixed’ polity.

Keywords: Analogical Language, Cosmopolitan Communitarianism, Citizenship, European Identity, Postnationalism

1 I am grateful to Lina Eriksson and John Besemer for very valuable comments to both the text and the content.
Algunos posnacionalistas, como Habermas, han sugerido la ciudadanía europea como un camino para superar los nacionalismos, fundamentando la pertenencia política en el cuerpo de las leyes que los miembros de la política pos-nacional generen en el espacio público. Comunitaristas cosmopolitas como Bellamy, piensan que los ciudadanos de la UE deberían formar una mancomunidad mixta, en la que la pertenencia política esté basada en las naciones. Argumentaré que la segunda opción es más deseable, y presentaré el carácter analógico de algunas ideas posteriors de ciudadanía, identidad y política. El comunitarismo cosmopolita promete fundar de mejor manera la riqueza de la diversidad europea: cultural, religiosa, histórica, política, legal y lingüística y, al mismo tiempo, mantener una cierta unidad para formar una política mixta.

Palabras clave: Lenguaje analógico, Comunitarismo cosmopolita, Ciudadanía, Identidad europea, Posnacionalismo
Lack of EU identity in the context of Europe’s existential crisis

The European motto established in year 2000 is: “[Europe] united in diversity”. In political terms, this means that Europe—or more precisely, the European Union (EU)—wishes to be one polity while maintaining and respecting the rich diversity of its members (states and citizens). Diversity is evident in aspects like culture, language, history, religion, geography, political traditions and so forth. But what can give Europe unity?

The European Political Community failed in 1954. In 1970, European Political Cooperation was introduced. In 1992 the European Community became part of the European Union. However enthusiasm for political integration among the population of the nascent EU was not great. Europe as a political project seemed to be ‘in crisis’ (Weiler: 1999, Cerutti: 2005). Some argued then and argue today that the crisis was not only political, but existential as well—threatening the very foundations of Europe (Weiler: 1999, 238-263; 2003; Weigel: 2005, Ratzinger & Pera: 2006, Ratzinger: 2007).

These discussions posed questions such as ‘What is Europe?’, ‘Where does Europe end?’, ‘Who can be considered a European?’, ‘What do Europeans have in common?’ Questions of ‘European identity’.

For Ratzinger, the work of European integration had two goals. The first one was to overcome the divisive nationalistic movements and hegemonic ideologies that had precipitated the II World War (Ratzinger: 2007, 35-46). The second was to present a unified front that...
served as a political counterbalance to the two great powers of the Cold War.

The way of peace (first goal of integration) as the common identity of Europeans and the common path towards the future, was grounded on the common cultural, moral and religious heritage of Europe (ibid). They were seeking

…a European identity that would not dissolve or deny the national identities, but rather unite them at a higher level of unity into one community of peoples (Ratzinger: 2007, 36).

Central to that cultural, moral and religious heritage were Christianity and the Enlightenment:

There is no doubt that among the founding fathers of European unification the Christian heritage was considered the nucleus of this historical identity—of course, not in its denominational forms; what was common to all Christians, however, seemed to be discernible beyond the denomination boundaries as a unifying force for action in the secular world. It did not even appear to be incompatible with the great moral ideals of the Enlightenment, which had given prominence, so to speak, to the rational dimension of the Christian reality and, transcending all the historical oppositions, certainly seemed to be compatible with the fundamental ideals of the Christian history of Europe (Ratzinger: 2007, 36).

This intuition, Ratzinger recognizes, has never been made clear and it demands a deeper study. Yet, reconciliation and unification of enemies would have not been possible without a common moral background, essential part of which, he claims, is Christianity.

The second goal of integration, to create a political counterbalance in the world stage, demanded that Europeans became an economic power. This was where the common identity—founded on the moral
background that all Europeans shared—met with an affirmation of common interests as well (not only). However,

...[o]ver the course of the developments in the last fifty years, this second aspect of European unification has become ever more dominant, almost exclusively influential. The common European currency is the clearest expression of this orientation in the work of European unification: Europe appears as an economic and monetary union, which as such participates in the formation of history and lays claim to a space of its own (Ratzinger: 2007, 37).

In sum, Ratzinger is bringing to discussion two ideas. The first one is that the common heritage shared by Europeans is based on Christianity and the Enlightenment together. Both are components of European identity, which is—if my interpretation is correct—not a national, strong identity of ‘the people’ of Europe, but a weaker form of identity of ‘the peoples’—the nations—of Europe. His second idea is that the project of European integration had, at the outset, two aims: reconciliation and reconstruction—peace and prosperity. Whenever one of the components of the common moral background (Christianity and Enlightenment) or one of the aims of integration (peace and prosperity) is forgotten, the project will suffer a crisis. We will return to these ideas later on.

The debate, approached from disciplines as varied as sociology, social psychology, anthropology, history, theology or cultural studies, has become important to political philosophy too: the European project had from the start some form of political integration as one of its goals, and for many the EU is a new kind of polity. In 1973 foreign ministers of the ‘Nine’ member states of the European Communities issued the ‘Copenhagen Declaration on European identity’. In 1999 the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission issued

4 Chryssoochhoou (2009, 6-14) calls it a ‘social scientific puzzle’. Former president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, once called it an ‘unidentified political object’ (Müller: 2004).

Efforts to foster an EU identity—often perceived as lacking—have included the creation of ‘symbols’ such as a European Flag, a European Anthem, a ‘Europe Day’, a European currency (the euro), a European motto and a ‘European citizenship’ (Jacobs & Maier, 1998). In this paper I will focus on the last element.

EU citizenship & political identity: the demos and telos problems

Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity (Weiler: 1999, 332). It provides a sense of belonging in a political community, rights derived from membership, and duties of participation in it (Leydet: 2006). It has thus three dimensions: identitarian—sense of belonging—, legal—rights (and duties)—and political—participation (Bellamy: 2008b, 599).

 Citizens constitute the polity’s demos—its ‘people’—, which often coincides with a nation (Weiler: 1999, 337). Now, while EU citizenship was introduced with the purpose of enhancing ‘European identity’ understood as the Europeans’ sense of belonging to their political community (Weiler: 1999, 333), such citizenship originated at least two problems.

The first problem was: What demos is EU citizenship based on? Is there a European demos, ‘People’? What happens then with the nations—peoples, demoi—of the member-states? Was there not supposed to be an ‘ever closer union’ among the peoples of Europe (Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union 2004)?

The second problem was this: If citizens are by definition members of a political community, of what kind of polity do the new

European citizens become members? And how does that polity relate to the existing member-states? Does it substitute them or assume them as in a federation? Is it a new kind of polity? Some have called this the telos problem.\textsuperscript{6}

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the beginning: national identity and citizenship}
\end{quote}

There were voices of concern about the creation of a European citizenship (Miller: 1998, Smith: 1992, Kymlicka: 2001, Offe: 2006, Grimm: 2005) reminding that citizenship had its place in nation-states, which are about the largest communities within which the identitarian (membership, belongingness) aspect of citizenship still makes sense. EU citizenship implied the creation of another \textit{demos} whose telos (a super-nation) either threatened European nation-states or simply was not going to work (Miller 1998, 49). This position is insightful of the way in which citizenship has been devised and has worked in contemporary democracies (Miscevic: 2005). There is a strong link between national identity and citizenship.

Membership in a polity confers rights, implies duties of participation and makes citizens ‘part of the club’. Citizenship creates a bond of unity between the members of the political community: all of them possess equal rights, are ruled and rule through political participation, and can develop a sense of belonging among strangers without threat to what makes each of them different (Leydet: 2006). In other words, citizenship successfully allows the fulfillment of unity in diversity. Yet there are certain elements that contribute to the political community’s shared identity: a language that everybody speaks, a common history, a landscape, perhaps a religious tradition, and others.

But Europe is too big and its member states (and peoples) are too diverse to make citizenship workable. For people across Europe ‘the nation remains [the] primary focus of political identity

\textsuperscript{6} As we shall see towards the end of the paper, Weiler (1999, 238-263) has in mind a third and no less important problem, that of the ethos of integration.
and allegiance’ (Miller: 1998, 49). Democracy will only be possible where all sections of society have a voice in public discussion. This is very difficult without a common language (English is spoken as a second language by the elites, not by all Europeans). Besides,

for democratic decision making to work successfully, each participating group must be willing to moderate its own demands in order to reach a compromise that everyone can accept… when a decision has been reached, those…in… minority…must be willing to comply with the outcome, knowing that their point of view has at least been taken seriously, and that on future occasions they may find themselves on the winning side. All this requires confidence in, and understanding of, those one disagrees with politically. Trust of this kind is much more likely to exist among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping cultural values (Miller: 1998, 48).

At the same time, social justice requires people to restrain their own demands, be fair in their dealings with, and make sacrifices for, other members of the political community. But what can motivate people to make the sacrifices that social justice requires, whether this takes the form of supporting parties that promise redistribution, or simply behaving in a fair way in their everyday lives? There is a wealth of evidence that shows that people are more willing to make such sacrifices the more closely they feel themselves tied to the likely beneficiaries of their actions…, people are more likely to afford equal treatment to others with whom they share a common identity or common values… From this point of view, nationhood is a very important source of common identity… (Miller: 1998, 48).

From this perspective, EU citizenship presents poor prospects. But these reflections deserve attention since they are based on what has
been the experience of citizenship so far, much more successful in national states than in multi-national ones.

Two approaches argue for citizenship beyond the nation-state. They involve different ideas about the *demos* and the *telos* questions. We will look first at the one that seems to have more adherents in the academic literature.

**Postnational citizenship**

Postnationalists (Habermas, Fossum: 2003, Delanty: 1997, 2007; Longo: 2008)\(^7\) see EU citizenship as a new, cosmopolitan form of belonging, which protects Europe from the dark risks of nationalism—all too evident in its recent history—and sets the conditions for the people of Europe—its *demos*—to build a post-national polity (*telos*) through deliberation and attachment to civic values. EU citizenship ought to be enhanced from its present form into a fully-fledged post-national citizenship (Habermas: 2001a, 2001b, 2006).

For Habermas the emergence of a ‘Federal States of Europe’—a post-national polity on the way to global governance—is possible only if political communities can form a collective identity beyond national borders, thus grounding the conditions of legitimacy for a ‘postnational democracy’ (2001b, 90). European citizens will have to learn ‘to mutually recognize one another as members of a common political existence beyond national borders’ (Habermas: 2001b, 98) in such a way that ‘Swedes and Portuguese are prepared to stand up for each other’, exercising a ‘civil solidarity that leads to the setting of—for example—roughly equivalent minimum wages’ (Habermas: 2003, 97). Against sceptics signalling to the impossibility of a ‘European people’ being created, Habermas points out that such an enterprise is difficult only if ‘people’ depends on a ‘pre-political community of fate’ (a nation), who are solidary to each other because a state

\(^7\) Or procedural cosmopolitans.
authority imposes on them that duty which they place above their own preferences (2001b, 101). For Habermas, however, there is

…a remarkable dissonance between the rather archaic features of the ‘obligation potential’ shared by comrades of fate who are willing to make sacrifices, on the one hand, and the normative self-understanding of the modern constitutional state as an uncoerced association of legal consociates, on the other… This picture fits poorly with an enlightenment culture whose normative core consists in the abolition of a publicly demanded sacrificium as an element of morality. The citizens of a democratic legal state understand themselves as the authors of the law, which compels them to obedience as its addressees. Unlike morality, positive law construes duties as something secondary; they arise only from the compatibility of the rights of each other with the equal rights of all (Habermas: 2001b, 101).

Habermas recognizes the nation as ‘the first modern form of collective identity’ (2001b), yet the different paths that the emergence of nation-states took in Europe—from state to nation (for example France) or from nation to state (for example Germany)—attest ‘to the constructed character of this new identity formation’ (Habermas: 2001b, 101). Civic solidarity among strangers was generated thanks to ‘a highly abstractive leap from the local and dynastic to national and then to democratic consciousness’: so…

…why shouldn’t this learning process be able to continue? different expectations would mutually stimulate and support each other in a circular process. The legitimation process has to be supported by a European party system that can develop to the degree that existing political parties, at first in their own respective national arenas, initiate a debate on the future of Europe and in the process articulate interests that cross national borders. And this debate, in turn, has to find resonance in a pan-European political public sphere that
presupposes a European civil society complete with interest groups, non-governmental organizations, citizens’ movements, and so forth… The normative impulses that first set these different processes in motion from their scattered national sites will themselves only come about through overlapping projects for a common political culture. But these projects can be constructed in the common historical horizon that the citizens of Europe already find themselves in (Habermas: 2001b, 103).

Habermas sees in the experiences of overcoming particularisms and conflicts among Europeans, successful forms of social integration that have shaped ‘the normative self-understanding of European modernity into an egalitarian universalism’ and can ease the transition to postnational democracy for ‘all of us—we, the sons, daughters, and grand-children of a barbaric nationalism’ (Habermas: 2001b, 103).

Cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship

Cosmopolitan communitarianists (Bellamy, Castiglione, Weiler, Walreigh) take a middle position between nationalism and postnationalism. To them EU citizenship should be perfected in its present form but not substantially changed. Existing alongside the national one, EU citizenship allows citizens to maintain their main source of political identification—belonging to their respective nations—and at the same time opens for them the benefits of a supranational atmosphere.8

If Europe is to maintain the richness of its diversity it should continue on the path of a ‘mixed commonwealth’ (MacCormick: 1997)—neither an intergovernmental organisation, like in the past, nor a federation, as some envisage its future (Bellamy & Walreigh: 1998b, 447)—with several dozen, drawing from the different cultural, linguistic and legal traditions of the member-states and, at the

8 Bellamy’s cosmopolitan communitarianism is inspired on neorepublicanism (Pettit) and different from Habermasian proceduralism and Rawlsian contractarianism.

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same time, keeping each other in check as a way to avoid the dangers of nationalism. EU citizenship should be kept and perfected in its present form (Bellamy: 1998 & 2008b).

Bellamy argues that the EU’s ‘hybridity can be sustained and developed by supplementing the elite-driven process and granting a greater political role to EU citizens’ (ibid). As the normative foundation of this multilevel polity he proposes an ‘ethics of participation… [n]either supranationally cosmopolitan nor communitarianly state-centric’ (Bellamy & Walreigh: 1998b, 448) but a ‘cosmopolitan communitarianism’ (ibid), attending to the original inspiration contained in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, that of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. In other words, he proposes ‘to leave the distinct peoplehood of the various Member States intact’ (Bellamy: 2006, 118).

He was against the ‘creation’ of a constitution in 2003 because it already existed (in the acquis communautaire or body of treaties), combining ‘a neo-republican form of governance with the evolution of a European common law, better suited to the EU’s character as an evolving polity’ that ‘ought to be improved and enhanced, not replaced’ (Bellamy: 2006, 118).

For Bellamy, the degree of belonging necessary

…to create an EU-wide demos is lacking, and rights provide an inadequate basis to fill this gap… How can then democratic participation on EU matters be meaningfully created? The answer, I suggest, lies in grasping the nettle posed by the EU’s poly-centric polity and multi-levelled regime. They provide the basis for shifting from demos-cracy to… demoi-cracy… For a demoi-cracy to work, far more European policies should be debated at the national and, where appropriate, sub-national level and mechanisms created that give these bodies the ability to review the allocation of competences. In other words, we need European politics to be

9 My italics.
brought down to the levels that make sense for people—to where they belong... After all... European politics currently works in this fashion, with European issues being framed by national political debates rather than becoming the focus of transnational movements (Bellamy: 2008b, 608).

Political participation of EU citizens should be seen as ‘nested in, rather than autonomous from, national citizenship’, since ‘democratic legitimacy is largely lent to the EU through the old forms of democratic citizenship that prevail in the member states’:

Given that there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of the EU developing adequate... mechanisms of its own, European citizenship must continue to be but an adjunct to national citizenship. Bringing the one more firmly under the scrutiny of the other, particularly with regard to decisions by the Court and other unelected bodies, and to some degree limiting the scope for European integration itself, provides the only viable way to enhance democracy within the EU (Bellamy: 2008b, 609).

A truly common dimension will grow only if the European project respects and works in nations, not if it tries to do away with them:

Paradoxically, the EU will only be treated seriously by ordinary citizens if they see it as an intrinsic part of domestic politics—as nested within the polities and regimes of Member States, rather than attempting to become a polity in its own right (Bellamy: 2006, 128).

In clear disagreement with Habermas regarding the demos question, Bellamy points out that there is no common European language and hence no pan-European media. Partially because of that, there is no shared political culture: in fact, concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and others are understood differently in each member-state. Finally, within a vast electorate, ‘in the absence of a

The ‘EU quasi-polity’ characterised as a ‘mixed-commonwealth’ means for Bellamy, the ongoing interaction between the polities and regimes of the member-states reflected in an EU that is, at the same time, national, supranational and transnational (Bellamy: 2006, 126). For him, ‘the post-national’ position

...is of itself too thin to generate allegiance to any polity in particular and, hence, once it moves beyond a general humanitarianism most communitarians would accept, it will always have a tendency to merge into supranationalism...this is what happens in Habermas’ case. In seeking to flesh out his argument as a distinctively ‘European’ [one]...his thesis loses certain of its postnational [cosmopolitan] credentials... Habermas has greatly exaggerated both the degree of system and value convergence within the European Union and the extent to which ‘political’ and ‘national’ values can be separated... (Bellamy & Castiglione: 2004, 189-190).

Whatever the concept used to talk about citizenship and the related polity, Bellamy abides always in the realm of the ‘national’ (e.g. ‘supra-national’, ‘trans-national’), whereas Habermas shifts attention towards a ‘post-national’ kind of citizenship and polity. Which of them is more desirable for Europe? Given that a European citizenship and a polity of sorts already exist, what colour ought they to take, cosmopolitan communitarianist or postnational? That depends on the key criterion one applies. To this I turn in the following section.

EU citizenship: an analogical reading

The criterion I suggest for assessing the normative value of the two contending proposals is the desire of the great majority of Europeans—synthesised in the EU motto—of having a ‘Europe united in
But how should it be interpreted? How is it different, for instance, from an apparently similar motto, *e pluribus unum*, adopted by the United States of America? In order to find out, I would like to suggest a reading of the EU motto—and consequently also of citizenship and the polity—that is ‘analogical’, in the sense in which Mauricio Beuchot uses this adjective.

Beuchot’s proposal has sprouted in the field of interpretation (hermeneutics) of linguistic and non-linguistic (Ramberg & Gjesdal: 2005) expressions. Based among others on certain classical and contemporary thinkers (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Heidegger, Pierce, Wittgenstein, Paz, Gadamer, Eco, Ricoeur), Beuchot has sought to offer a middle ground between two opposing theories of interpretation: ‘univocism’ and ‘equivocism’ (Beuchot: 2005a, 21). Univocist interpretation would have been used in classical positivism—John Stuart Mill—, neo-positivism—Carnap—and logical positivism—Quine, Hilary Putnam. Equivocist interpretation would be found in romanticism—Schleiermacher—and relativism—Nietzsche, Foucault, Rorty, and Derrida (Beuchot: 2004, 63; 2005a, 22-25, 97; 2005b, 243-247; 2006, 22-24). Beuchot’s position lies in between. Against univocism, he denies that there is a unique and absolute interpretation of ‘the text’. But against equivocism, he does not concede that all interpretations are incommensurable and equally valid. He claims that certain interpretations are closer to the true meaning of the text than others, and that such interpretations can be ordered accordingly in a hierarchy—by analogy (Beuchot: 2006, 15-17).

For the nearly five hundred million EU citizens today, their national cultures, languages, history, and political, religious and legal traditions, are a treasure that the European project ought to cherish and respect. From the outset they joined the common enterprise on this assumption. The overwhelming majority of them identify first with their own nations and only secondarily—if at all—with ‘Europe’ or (even less) ‘the EU’. Most of them are happy with the EU as an enhancement of their national spheres, but never as a substitute. The

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10 For the historical account on how it was created, see Curti Gialdino (2005).
European motto, if it is to mean anything to EU citizens, ought to reflect this fact and therefore should not be read as proposing to make ‘one out of many’—a melting pot—with the stress on the side of unity; but rather to create a weaker unity, one befallen ‘in diversity’, with the stress on the latter.

Borrowing from Beuchot’s insights, I would like to submit that EU unity, citizenship and polity should be regarded as ‘analogical’. Analogical to what? To the national referent. In other words, the unity of the EU polity should be analogical to the one of the nations, though weaker. EU citizenship should provide a collective identity, a sense of belonging, but subordinated or added to national citizenships. The EU polity should be less defined, centralised and important than the national polities. A model of citizenship and political unity for Europe ought to have an analogical character in this sense.

Having this in mind, what kind of EU citizenship (and associated concept of polity) ought to be promoted, postnational or cosmopolitan communitarianist? In the next section I will try to show that the cosmopolitan communitarianist option agrees better with what Europeans want and the EU motto expresses, and is therefore more desirable than the postnational alternative.

Cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship: the lesser evil?

Postnational citizenship is aimed at ridding Europe of nationalism—often root of bloody conflicts in the region—and at creating a common demos with the related postnational polity. Under a cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship, nationalism is allowed to continue existing, while its excesses are kept in check through a balance between the different demoi of the mixed polity. Which one is more desirable?

Departing from the premise that Europe cherishes its diversity and that national traditions and values must be preserved as elements not only of cultural richness, but also as the see of the citizens’ main political identity, the cosmopolitan communitarianist option

11 As the American motto would appear to suggest.
seems better. It does not destroy or ‘overcome’ national identities—Europe’s diversity—in the name of a postnational situation which not only does not correspond with the reality of Europe, but promises very weak allegiances—if any—from ordinary Europeans.

Nationalism—the exaggeration of nationality—with the pretence that it makes a people not only particular (as in ‘different’) but *superior* to others, ought of course to be rejected. But does that render nations—and nation-states—a thing of the past? Not necessarily. Nationality—let us distinguish it from ‘nationalism’—carries with itself a great richness expressed in many ways: language, legal and religious traditions, history, political systems and so on. Furthermore, nation-states have proved to be an effective form of political organisation.

Postnationalists run the risk of pursuing unity by cancelling diversity. Because nationality has had excesses, they purport to uproot it altogether. Cosmopolitan communitarianism proceeds from the fact that nations are a reality in Europe. Most Europeans (except maybe for small elites) draw their collective identity (political and otherwise) much more from their nation than from ‘Europe’. A project that understands diversity and looks for ways to coordinate such diversity politically, promises to be hard and messy, but so has European integration been from its beginnings. That is the price of preserving diversity.\(^1\)

True, the kind of unity that can be derived from postnationalism would be stronger and clearer than the one coming from cosmopolitan communitarianism; ‘postnational federation’—even if grounded on an identity perceived as thin—sounds a lot more defined than ‘mixed-commonwealth’ or—still worse—‘quasi-polity’. Yet this corresponds better with the reality of the European project as it has unfolded, and—more importantly—with the great richness of the European nations—‘the peoples of Europe’.

However if collective identity is a problem in the case of postnationalism, which proposes to create a postnational *demos*, it becomes an even more acute difficulty in the case of cosmopolitan communitarianism. How can unity exist among different peoples without

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12 ‘There is virtue in living with mess if we can make it ours’ (Bellamy & Walreigh: 1998a, 10).
them fusing into a single people? How can the national citizen remain such and still have some allegiance to a larger political community? How can a mixed commonwealth that encompasses several peoples still be one? And what kind of identity would it have? This problem is considered in the next and last section.

Challenges: identity, unity and the common language

The cosmopolitan communitarianist option, as we have seen, is messy and imperfect. It does not create a clear-cut polity with a proper name (‘federation’ for example). It is not ‘univocal’—extrapolating Beuchot’s terms. Neither does it, however, renounce to some kind of European unity, to a possible commonality among diverse members. It is not completely ‘equivocal’. Bellamy’s ‘cosmopolitan communitarianism’ (Bellamy & Castiglione: 2004) respects diversity, but it still proposes some kind of unity. Not overriding (‘univocal’ unity) or completely relativised and dissolved (‘equivocal’ unity), but analogical, with an analogical citizenship and identity (not strong but still existent) and an analogical polity (polycentric and multilevelled, but still a polity—or at least a ‘quasi-polity’).

One of the challenges is to specify how unity can be created and maintained, and if the cohesion of the mixed (or could we say, analogical?) commonwealth requires some shared values or culture, even if in very basic terms. Unity in this polity relies on certain sacrifices of national sovereignty. But are those sacrifices not made under the assumption that others will do the same, that ‘we’ (each European nation) can trust ‘them’ (the other European nations)? And can that be grounded only on a body of treaties (the ‘mobile constitution’ of the EU) or do they rely on deeper, pre-political moral suppositions? Friese & Wagner (2002, 335) wonder if Bellamy ‘and others’ are not taking agreement about Europeanness for granted, disregarding thus the question of any substantive orientation of the polity: because if that is true, ‘…they may indeed join Habermas’ (ibid).

This could be one of the strongest objections to the cosmopolitan communitarianist proposal: if a demos is not created, if the demoi
are maintained in their valuable diversity, what is going to unite Europeans? What will make them trust each other for the necessary arrangements and sacrifices of sovereignty that even this mixed-commonwealth implies?

Certainly the first step for the emergence of the most basic collective identity and unity in contemporary democratic polities is the presence of a common language. But due to its nature, the EU cannot have a common language because national languages are part of the diversity citizens want to maintain. Here Beuchot’s concepts might come handy. How about a common ground for communication that is not a proper language, but a language of sorts, an ‘analogical language’, which therefore does not threaten the existence of the European national languages?

Due to lack of space I cannot fully explore that idea here. All I can do is to hint to a possibility that could serve as an example of potential candidates for that common language of sorts. For this, I would like to recall a few of the thoughts alluded to at the beginning of this paper.

Ratzinger referred to the moral, pre-political common ground provided in Europe by Christianity, not in its denominational form but in its principles. This common ground is shared by all of the member-states in the EU. Christianity could be an analogical ‘language’ since it is already there, embedded in the national mentalities; it would not have to be created. In the words of atheist philosopher Marcello Pera,

I agree that we must commit to defending certain basic values, principles, and institutions, such as human dignity (a Christian concept), heterosexual marriage and the family (a biological and natural concept), and respect for other religions (a cultural concept that gained ground in Europe especially after the religious wars)… This is not enough,

13 This is an interesting avenue of research, but by no means the only one. Elsewhere I have investigated other possible sources of European identity, for instance welfare (the ‘European Way of Life’), the international image of the EU (as a ‘normative power’) or even a ‘composed identity’ (Jiménez: 2010).
however. We need to search for a broader and deeper spirit, a general conceptual framework for these values, principles and institutions, and a common feeling that gives them breathing room, cultural weight, and the force of custom (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 94-95).

Pera continues to suggest that the work of making that common language more evident should be done ‘by Christians and secularists together’:

> What we need today is a civil religion that can instill its values throughout the long chain that goes from the individual to the family, groups, associations, the community, and civil society, without passing through the political parties, government programs, and force of states, and therefore without affecting the separation, in the temporal sphere, between church and state. In Europe and in the West so enriched by Europe, such a religion would already be Christian by nature… What I am suggesting is therefore a non-denominational Christian religion… (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 95-96).

Pera’s ‘civil religion’ is ‘natural to the state’:

> The modern democratic and social state is especially paternalistic and moral. In its desire to care for its citizens (from cradle, if not sooner, to grave), it must necessarily adopt and safeguard within its own public sphere many values that are widespread in the private sphere of individuals, groups, or categories. A non-denominational Christian religion is therefore both private and public. Private, because of the faith of the individuals who profess it. Public, because it is the common spirit and feeling of the civil society that it sustains (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 97).

The concept of a ‘civil religion’ is complex and I do not intend to explain it or even less to assess it here. I just mention it as one among
many possible answers to a problem that needs to be addressed by the cosmopolitan communitarianist perspective.

Certainly, the moral background that springs from Christianity (or from a broader Biblical tradition that encompasses the three great monotheistic religions, perhaps?) is common to all of the EU countries. Pera recalls John Adams’ words about the American constitution having been ‘made only for a moral and religious people’. Ratzinger quotes Tocqueville as saying ‘Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot’ (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 109). That in United States the existence of a basic, non-denominational religious and moral consensus based on Christianity is easier to see than in Europe is another problem (ibid) which demands a separate analysis.

For Jewish Professor Joseph Weiler, the role and possible usefulness of Christianity in the construction of ‘Europe’ has received surprisingly little attention in the academic literature about European integration (Weiler: 2003, 47-48). The European project has never been one concerned simply with the creation of a free-market region, but possesses the aspiration to build an ‘ethical community’. The Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty declared the desire to continue a path of civility, progress and prosperity for all its inhabitants (Weiler: 2003, 45). Europe’s memory, its history, that provides it with an identity, the basis for the union of its demoi upon an ethos and a telos, has always had the presence of Christianity (Weiler, 2003: 45). Christianity cannot be erased even from Europe’s contemporary history (Weiler: 2003, 46). It has influenced Europe’s political culture, ideas, values and morality (Weiler: 2003, 44).

Bellamy’s conception still needs a common—even if analogical—language. Weiler coincides with Bellamy regarding the demos and the telos questions, but not the ethos one, which could probably offer a path to make cosmopolitan communitarianism a stronger position.

In this paper I have sought to normatively ponder two approaches to EU citizenship and argue for the one that seems more desirable. Additionally, I have suggested a new reading of that option, which might broaden the understanding of its original meaning. Finally, I have outlined challenges and suggested possible avenues of future research to face them.
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